Monadology

by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

 

 

1 The monads, which are the subject of my writing, are nothing but simple substances, which are contained in composites. Simple means that which has no parts.

2 There must be simple substances because there are composites, for a composite is nothing but an accumulation or aggregation of simple substances.

3 Now, where there are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor division is possible. The monads I speak of are, therefore, the true atoms of nature and, in short, the elements of things.

4 Their dissolution is not to be feared, and it is inconceivable that a simple substance could perish in any natural way.

5 For the same reason, it is inconceivable that a simple substance could begin naturally, as it cannot be formed by composition.

6 Thus, one may say that monads can only begin and end all at once. They can only begin through creation and cease through annihilation, while composites arise from parts and perish into parts.

7 Furthermore, there is no way to explain how a monad could be disturbed or altered internally by any other creature, as there is nothing to move within it and no internal motion to comprehend that could be caused, directed, increased, or diminished—as may happen in composites, where changes among parts are possible. Monads have no windows through which anything can enter or leave. Accidents cannot separate from substances and roam outside them, as the species sensibiles of the Scholastics once did. Therefore, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from the outside.

8 However, monads must have certain qualities; otherwise, they would not be beings that exist. Moreover, if simple substances were not distinguished by their qualities, there would be no way to notice any change in things, because what occurs in composites only arises from their simple components. If the monads had no qualities, they could not be distinguished from one another, as they have no quantitative differences. Consequently, assuming that all space is full, every location would always replace itself with what it already contained, and one state of things would be indistinguishable from another.

9 It is even necessary that each monad is distinct from every other. For in nature, there are never two beings that are perfectly alike, where it would be impossible to find an internal or intrinsic difference.

10 Furthermore, I assume that every created being, and therefore every created monad, is subject to change and that this change continuously occurs within each.

11 From the above, it follows that the natural changes of monads originate from an internal principle, as an external cause cannot influence their interior.

12 Beyond the principle of change, there must also be a specific characteristic of what changes, which constitutes the different and manifold types of monads.

13 This characteristic necessarily contains a multiplicity within unity or the simple. Since all natural change occurs gradually, some elements change while others remain constant. Therefore, there must be a plurality of actions and relationships within the monad, even though it does not consist of parts.

14 The transient state that contains and represents a multiplicity in unity or the simple substance is nothing other than what is called perception. This perception must, as will be shown later, be distinguished from apperception or conscious representation. Cartesian philosophers erred greatly by considering unconscious perceptions as nothing. This error led them to believe that only spirits are monads and that there are no animal souls or other entelechies. Thus, they fell into the common confusion of equating prolonged unconsciousness with death. This mistake ultimately led them to the Scholastic prejudice of entirely incorporeal souls and even encouraged certain misguided thinkers in their delusion of the soul’s mortality.

15 The activity of the internal principle, which causes the transition from one perception to another, can be described as desire. However, desire does not always fully achieve the entire representation it aims for but always attains something from it, leading to new representations.

16 We can confirm the multiplicity within the simple substance through experience when we realize that even the smallest thought of which we are aware contains a multitude of elements within its object. Thus, those who acknowledge the soul as a simple substance must also recognize this multiplicity within the monad. And Mr. Bayle need not have found difficulty in this, as he did in his dictionary, article Rorarius.

17 Moreover, one must necessarily admit that perception and what depends on it cannot be explained mechanically, that is, through figures and motions. Suppose there were a machine so constructed that it produced thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. It would be conceivable to enlarge it to a scale that allowed one to enter it like a mill. Assuming this, upon examining its interior, one would only find individual parts pushing against each other—never anything to explain a perception. Therefore, perception must be sought within the simple substance, not in the composite or machinery. Within the simple substance, only this can be found: perceptions and their changes. These alone constitute the internal activities of monads.

18 All simple substances or created monads could be called entelechies, for they contain a certain perfection (έχουσι τό έντελές) in themselves. They have a self-sufficiency (αύτάρκεια), making them sources of their internal activities and, in a way, incorporeal automatons.

19 If we choose to define all simple substances or created monads as possessing perception and desire, they could all be called souls. However, since conscious perception is more than mere perception, the term "monad" or "entelechy" may suffice for those simple substances with only simple perceptions. The term "soul" should be reserved for monads whose perceptions are clearer and accompanied by memory.

20 Indeed, we learn from experience that there are times when we recall nothing and have no distinct perception, for instance, when we faint or fall into a deep, dreamless sleep. In such states, the soul is scarcely distinguishable from a simple monad. But as this state does not persist and the soul escapes it, it is something higher.

21 However, it does not follow that the simple substance is ever without perception. This is not possible for the reasons given above: it cannot perish, nor can it exist without some form of activity, and this activity is nothing other than perception. When a large number of small perceptions come together, with none standing out distinctly, we are stupefied. For instance, if one spins continuously in the same direction several times, dizziness ensues, causing unconsciousness and an inability to distinguish anything. Similarly, death temporarily places living beings into this state.

22 Every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, as the present bears within it the future.

23 This implies that, upon awakening from a stupor, one must have had preceding perceptions, though they were unconscious. A perception can naturally only arise from another perception, just as movement can naturally only come from another movement.

24 Thus, we would always remain in a state of stupor if our perceptions did not include something distinct and prominent, creating a stronger stimulus. This is the state of mere monads.

25 Nature has provided animals with distinct perceptions by carefully forming organs capable of gathering multiple rays of light or waves of air into one, thus achieving stronger effects. Similar mechanisms exist for smell, taste, and touch, and perhaps in many other senses unknown to us. I will soon explain how the activities of the soul correspond to the workings of the organs.

26 Memory provides souls with a type of linkage that mimics reason but differs from it. For instance, animals, when perceiving something that strongly affects them and recalling a similar perception from the past, anticipate what was previously associated with it and experience similar feelings. If dogs are shown a stick, they remember the pain it caused and howl and run away.

27 The force of imagination, which drives animals in such cases, arises from either the strength or the repetition of earlier perceptions. A strong impression can produce the same effect in a single instance as many repeated moderate perceptions.

28 Humans act like irrational animals insofar as the succession of their perceptions follows the principle of memory. This is akin to the behavior of empirical physicians, who practice without theory. Indeed, most of our actions are empirical, based on past experience rather than reasoning. For example, expecting day to follow night is an empirical conclusion: it has always been so. Only astronomers reason about this based on rational principles.

29 However, the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths elevates us above mere animals, granting us reason and science, and allowing us to know ourselves and God. This knowledge of eternal truths is what makes us rational souls or spirits.

30 Through the understanding of necessary truths and their abstractions, we achieve reflexive acts that enable us to grasp the concept of "I" and reflect on what is within us. By directing our thoughts toward ourselves, we also direct them toward being, substance, the simple and the composite, the immaterial, and even toward God, as we understand the finite aspects within us as infinite within Him. These reflexive acts are the principal objects of our reason.

31 The use of reason is based on two great principles: first, the principle of contradiction, which declares false what involves a contradiction and true what opposes or contradicts the false.

32 Second, the principle of sufficient reason, by which we acknowledge that no fact can exist and no statement be true without there being a sufficient reason for it to be so and not otherwise, even if these reasons are often beyond our understanding.

33 There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposites are impossible. Truths of fact are contingent, and their opposites are possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, breaking it down into simpler ideas and truths until reaching the basic principles.

34 In this way, mathematicians reduce theoretical theorems and practical rules to definitions, axioms, and postulates through analysis.

35 Ultimately, there are basic ideas that cannot be defined. There are also axioms and postulates, or in a word, primary principles that cannot and need not be proven. These are the identical propositions whose opposites contain an explicit contradiction.

36 However, sufficient reason must also be found in contingent or factual truths, within the series of created things. The analysis of reasons here can continue infinitely due to the immense variety of nature and the infinite divisibility of matter. The infinite series of preceding events forms the causal explanation for any current situation.

37 Therefore, the ultimate sufficient reason must lie outside this series of contingent things, even though it is infinite. The ultimate reason must exist in a necessary substance, which we call God.

38 This necessary substance, containing the source of all changes within itself eminently, provides the sufficient reason for the series of contingent things.

39 Thus, there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.

40 Furthermore, since this supreme substance, which is unique, universal, and necessary, has nothing outside itself that is independent of it, and since it is a simple consequence of the possible being, we can conclude that it must be unlimited and contain as much reality as possible.

41 Thus, it follows that God is absolutely perfect. Perfection is nothing other than the magnitude of positive reality, considered in its true essence, without the limitations or restrictions found in finite things. Where there are no limits, as in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.

42 Consequently, creatures derive their perfections from the influence of God, but their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limitations. This is the distinction between them and God. (This original imperfection of creatures is evident in the natural inertia of bodies.)

43 It is also true that in God lies not only the source of existences but also that of essences, insofar as they are real, that is, of what is real in possibility. For the divine intellect is the realm of eternal truths or ideas upon which essences depend. Without Him, there would be nothing real in possibilities—not only nothing existing but also nothing possible.

44 If there is reality in essences or possibilities, or in eternal truths, this reality must be grounded in something existent and actual—in the existence of a necessary being, in which essence and existence are one, or where it suffices to be possible to be actual.

45 Thus, God (or the necessary being) uniquely possesses the privilege of existing necessarily if He is possible. Since nothing can prevent the possibility of that which contains no limitations, no negation, and no contradiction, this is sufficient to prove God's existence a priori. We have also demonstrated it through the reality of eternal truths. Furthermore, we have shown it a posteriori, as contingent beings exist and must have their ultimate or sufficient reason in the necessary being, which contains the reason for its existence within itself.

46 However, one must not imagine, as some philosophers have, that eternal truths—which depend on God—are therefore arbitrary and subject to His will, as Descartes and later Poiret seemed to suggest. This applies only to contingent truths, whose principle is fitness or the choice of the best, while necessary truths depend solely on God's understanding and constitute its internal object.

47 Therefore, God alone is the primal unity or the original monad. All created or derived monads are His productions, arising continually through divine emanations, limited by the capacity of the created being, which is necessarily finite.

48 In God, there is power, the source of all things; knowledge, which contains the multiplicity of ideas; and will, which enacts changes or creations according to the principle of the best. In created monads, these attributes correspond to the individual basis or fundamental essence, the capacity for perception, and the capacity for desire. In God, however, these attributes are absolutely infinite and perfect, whereas in created monads or entelechies, they are mere imitations, varying in degree of perfection.

49 A creature acts outwardly insofar as it possesses perfection and is acted upon by others insofar as it is imperfect. Similarly, a monad is said to act insofar as it has distinct perceptions and to suffer insofar as its perceptions are confused.

50 A creature is more perfect than another when one can find in it a priori the reason for what happens in the other. In this sense, it is said to act upon the other.

51 However, in simple substances, there is only an ideal influence of one monad on another, which can only have its effect through the mediation of God, insofar as the idea of one monad requires that God consider it in relation to the others. Since a created monad cannot have a physical influence on the interior of another, the dependency of one on the other can only occur through this means.

52 Consequently, among creatures, action and suffering are mutual. For when God compares two simple substances, He finds in each reasons that compel Him to adapt the other to it. Thus, from one perspective, what is active can be considered passive from another. It is active insofar as what is distinct in it serves to explain what happens in another. It is passive insofar as the reason for what happens in it is found in what is distinct in the other.

53 Since God's ideas contain infinite possible worlds, but only one can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God's choice of one world over another.

54 This reason is found only in the fitness or degrees of perfection that these worlds contain, as every possible entity has the right to strive for existence proportionate to the perfection it embodies.

55 This is the reason for the existence of the best world, which God’s wisdom knows, His goodness chooses, and His power brings into being.

56 This harmony or adjustment of all created things with one another, and of each with the whole, ensures that every simple substance expresses the entire universe, acting as a living mirror of the world.

57 Just as a city viewed from different perspectives appears distinct, with as many representations as there are vantage points, so too does the infinite number of simple substances create as many distinct views of the universe. Yet these views all represent the same world.

58 Through this arrangement, the greatest possible variety is achieved, along with the greatest possible order. This maximizes perfection.

59 This hypothesis—which I dare to call proven—properly highlights God's greatness. Even Bayle, who objected in his dictionary (article Rorarius), admitted that he could find no reason for the impossibility of such world harmony.

60 It also follows from this that the course of events cannot unfold otherwise than they do. For God, in ordering the whole, considered every individual monad, each representing the universe according to its unique perspective. However, no monad can express the entire infinite variety of the universe clearly, as this is reserved for God alone. Monads are limited by the clarity of their perceptions.

61 The composite is symbolically connected to the simple. Since all matter is interconnected and the entire universe is full, every movement affects distant bodies proportionally to their distance. Each body is influenced not only by those in immediate contact with it but also indirectly by those connected to its neighbors. Consequently, this communication extends infinitely. Every body perceives everything that happens in the universe, so someone with perfect perception could read in each individual body everything occurring elsewhere, even past and future events, as they are implicitly contained in the present state.

62 Although every created monad represents the entire universe, it distinctly represents the body to which it is specifically assigned, whose entelechy it constitutes. And since this body expresses the entire universe through the interconnectedness of matter, the soul also represents the universe by representing its body, which uniquely belongs to it.

63 The body belonging to a monad, which serves as its entelechy or soul, forms what we call a living being, or with the soul, an animal. This body of a living being or animal is always organic, as every monad mirrors the universe and the universe is organized according to perfect order. Thus, there must be order in what represents it, i.e., in the perceptions of the soul and the body expressing the universe to the soul.

64 Every organic body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton that infinitely surpasses artificial machines. Machines created by human art are not mechanical in all their parts. For instance, the teeth of a brass wheel are not themselves miniature machines designed for the function of the wheel. But the natural machines, or living bodies, remain machines down to their smallest parts, ad infinitum. This distinguishes natural creations from artificial ones and divine craftsmanship from human ingenuity.

65 The Author of Nature could accomplish this infinite wonder because every piece of matter is infinitely divisible, with each part containing its own distinct motion. Otherwise, it would be impossible for every piece of matter to express the universe.

66 From this, it follows that in the smallest part of matter exists a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, entelechies, and souls.

67 Every fragment of nature can be viewed as a garden full of plants or a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant, every limb of an animal, every drop of its fluids is itself a garden or a pond.

68 Although the earth and air between plants in a garden, or the water between fish in a pond, are not themselves plants or fish, they contain others of a subtleness that escapes our perception.

69 Thus, there is nothing barren, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe; no chaos, no confusion, except as it might appear superficially, like observing a pond from a distance where one perceives only a chaotic motion of fish without distinguishing them.

70 Every living body has a dominant entelechy, which in animals is the soul. However, the parts of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, and animals, each of which also has its entelechy or governing soul.

71 One should not imagine, as some have misunderstood my doctrine, that every soul has a mass or piece of matter permanently assigned to it or that it always governs lower living beings meant solely for its service. Instead, all bodies are in perpetual flux, with parts continuously entering and leaving.

72 Thus, the soul changes its body only gradually, never losing all its organs at once. There are often metamorphoses in animals but no complete transmigration of souls. Nor are there entirely separate, bodiless souls or spirits; only God is wholly free of a body.

73 Consequently, there is strictly speaking no total generation and no complete death involving the separation of soul and body. What we call generation is merely development and growth, and what we call death is envelopment and diminution.

74 Philosophers have long puzzled over the origin of forms, entelechies, or souls. Today, from careful study of plants, insects, and other organisms, it has been observed that organic bodies do not emerge from chaos or decay but always from seeds, which contain some preformation. This has led to the belief that not only is the organic body present in the seed before conception, but also the soul and, in short, the living being itself. Conception merely enables this being to undergo significant transformation, resulting in a creature of another kind. Similar observations can be made without conception, as in the transformation of larvae into flies or caterpillars into butterflies.

75 These living beings, some of which ascend to the level of larger animals through conception, may be called spermatic. Most remain within their kind—they are born, reproduce, and perish like larger animals. Only a few selected ones advance to a higher stage.

76 From this, I deduce that if animals never naturally begin, they also never naturally end. Consequently, there is no total generation, destruction, or death in the strict sense. Observations drawn from experience align perfectly with these principles derived a priori.

77 Thus, one can assert that not only is the soul (as a mirror of an indestructible universe) indestructible, but the animal itself, though its machine may often partially perish and change its organic coverings.

78 These principles provide a means to explain the union or harmony of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body follows its own laws, yet their operations are perfectly synchronized due to pre-established harmony, as they both represent the same universe.

79 Souls act according to the laws of final causes, through desires, purposes, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes, or motions. These two realms—the realm of efficient causes and the realm of final causes—harmonize perfectly.

80 Descartes acknowledged that souls cannot impart force to bodies because the quantity of force in matter remains constant. However, he believed the soul could alter the body’s direction, a view stemming from ignorance of the law of nature that preserves total momentum. Had Descartes known this, he might have adopted my system of pre-established harmony.

81 According to this system, bodies operate as though there were no souls, and souls operate as though there were no bodies. Yet both act in perfect harmony as if influencing each other.

82 For spirits or rational souls, the above applies to all living beings and animals. However, rational beings are unique in that, while their primitive state is shared with other animals, those selected through conception ascend to the rational level, becoming spirits with the ability to reason.

83 Unlike ordinary souls, spirits are images of the divine, capable of understanding the world system and imitating it in their way, as each spirit is, in its sphere, a micro-deity.

84 This allows spirits to enter into a relationship with God, not merely as creatures with their Creator, but as subjects with their Sovereign and even as children with their Father.

85 Therefore, the assembly of all spirits constitutes the kingdom of God, the most perfect state under the most perfect monarch.

86 This kingdom of God, this true universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world, the highest and most divine among God’s works. It is here that God’s true glory resides, being recognized and admired by spirits. His goodness governs this moral world, while His wisdom and power govern the natural world.

87 Just as there is harmony between efficient causes and final causes, there is harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, between God as the architect of the universe and God as the monarch of the divine state of spirits.

88 This harmony ensures that natural events lead to grace. For instance, the Earth may be destroyed and restored at moments aligning with the governance of spirits, serving as punishment for some and compensation for others.

89 Thus, God as the architect satisfies God as the lawgiver. Sins naturally carry their punishment within themselves, while virtuous deeds bring rewards through the laws of nature, even if not immediately apparent.

90 Ultimately, in this perfect government, no good deed will go unrewarded, and no evil deed will go unpunished. Everything contributes to the good of those who trust in divine providence, fulfilling their duties and rejoicing in the perfection of God’s creation.

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